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Abstract:  
In a plain-vanilla New Keynesian model with two-period staggered price-setting, 
discretionary monetary policy leads to multiple equilibria. Complementarity between the 
pricing decisions of forward-looking firms underlies the multiplicity, which is intrinsically 
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accommodates the level of predetermined prices when setting the money supply because it is 
concerned solely about real activity. Hence, if other firms set a high price in the current 
period, an individual firm will optimally choose a high price because it knows that the 
monetary authority next period will accommodate with a high money supply. Under 
commitment, the mechanism generating complementarity is absent: the monetary authority 
commits not to respond to future predetermined prices. Multiple equilibria also arise in other 
similar contexts where (i) a policymaker cannot commit, and (ii) forward-looking agents 
determine a state variable to which future policy responds. 
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 Non-technical summary
In the debate over rules versus discretion for monetary policy, the primary argument
against discretion has been that it leads to higher average inﬂation than is optimal with
commitment. In the consensus basic model which has developed following Kydland and
Prescott [1977] and Barro and Gordon [1983], the discretionary monetary authority seeks
to produce unexpected inﬂation to stimulate real output, which is ineﬃciently low because
of distortions in the economy. But since it cannot fool agents in rational expectations
equilibrium, the discretionary monetary authority produces expected inﬂation that has a
negligible real eﬀect on output, while imposing other costs on the economy.
By contrast, this paper provides an example of a diﬀerent, potentially adverse, conse-
quence of discretionary monetary policy: it can lead to multiple equilibria and, thus, to
the possibility of endogenous ﬂuctuations in inﬂation and real activity that are not related
to the economy’s fundamentals. We illustrate this possibility within a simple dynamic
macroeconomic model that has important New Keynesian features: (i) monopolistic com-
petition, making output ineﬃciently low; and (ii) a staggered pricing structure in which
ﬁrms set nominal prices that must be held ﬁxed for two periods. These two features give
the monetary authority some leverage over real activity.
In this simple setting, the multiplicity of equilibria derives from interaction between
two features of the economy. First, ﬁrms adopt forward-looking pricing rules because
their nominal prices are held ﬁxed for two periods. In choosing a price, ﬁrms in the
current period need to form expectations about the behavior of the monetary authority
—a n dﬁrms — in the next period. A higher future money supply leads to a higher future
nominal marginal cost, which raises the optimal price for a ﬁrm in the current period.
Second, under discretion, the monetary authority takes as given prices set in previous
periods in determining its choice of the money stock in each period. Since its concern
is to maximize the welfare of the representative agent, which depends on real variables,
it chooses a money stock that is proportional to the price set by ﬁrms in the previous
period, which we call a homogenous money stock rule.
The combination of forward-looking pricing with discretionary policy leads to com-
plementarity between the price-setting actions of ﬁrms: if all other ﬁrms set a higher
price in the current period, the monetary authority will set a higher money supply in the
subsequent period, raising the desired price for a single ﬁrm in the current period.
We show that this policy-induced complementarity implies that there are typically
two private-sector equilibria which can prevail at any point in time and two steady-state
2equilibria. In general, there is one equilibrium in which ﬁrms expect small adjustments
and the newly set price is relatively close to the price that ﬁrms set last period. But there
is another in which the adjusting ﬁrms make a much larger adjustment.
Because this multiplicity of equilibria arises for arbitrary homogenous monetary poli-
cies, it also arises with an optimizing monetary authority who cannot commit to future
actions. We begin by considering settings of perfect foresight, in which the monetary
authority and private agents each assume that only one of the two types of private sector
equilibria will occur. We show that there are two steady-state discretionary equilibria,
one with low inﬂation bias and one with high inﬂation bias. It is notable that the comple-
mentarity which generates multiple equilibria is entirely due, in our model, to the nature
of monetary policy under discretion. That is: our speciﬁcation of preferences and the la-
bor market is such that there is no complementarity in the price-setting behavior of ﬁrms
if the central bank maintains a ﬁxed nominal money stock. Our setup thus highlights the
role of discretionary monetary policy in generating complementarity.
While our results concern the interaction between a monetary policymaker and a
forward-looking private sector that sets prices for only two periods, they are indicative of
a more general phenomenon, both in the context of monetary policy and in other areas
of economics. The necessary features for the kind of phenomenon we describe are as
follows: (i) a policymaker that cannot commit to future actions, and (ii) forward-looking
private agents whose current actions determine a state-variable to which the policymaker
responds in the future. These features seem quite widespread, suggesting that lack of
commitment may be an important cause of economic instability.
31 Introduction
In the debate over rules versus discretion for monetary policy, the primary argument
against discretion has been that it leads to higher average inﬂation than is optimal with
commitment. In the consensus basic model which has developed following Kydland and
Prescott [1977] and Barro and Gordon [1983], the discretionary monetary authority seeks
to produce unexpected inﬂation to stimulate real output, which is ineﬃciently low because
of distortions in the economy. But since it cannot fool agents in rational expectations
equilibrium, the discretionary monetary authority produces expected inﬂation that has a
negligible real eﬀect on output, while imposing other costs on the economy.
By contrast, this paper provides an example of a diﬀerent, potentially adverse, conse-
quence of discretionary monetary policy: it can lead to multiple equilibria and, thus, to
the possibility of endogenous ﬂuctuations in inﬂation and real activity that are not related
to the economy’s fundamentals. We illustrate this possibility within a simple dynamic
macroeconomic model that has important New Keynesian features: (i) monopolistic com-
petition, making output ineﬃciently low; and (ii) a staggered pricing structure in which
ﬁrms set nominal prices that must be held ﬁxed for two periods. These two features give
the monetary authority some leverage over real activity.
In this simple setting, the multiplicity of equilibria derives from interaction between
two features of the economy. First, ﬁrms adopt forward-looking pricing rules because
their nominal prices are held ﬁxed for two periods. In choosing a price, ﬁrms in the
current period need to form expectations about the behavior of the monetary authority
—a n dﬁrms — in the next period. A higher future money supply leads to a higher future
nominal marginal cost, which raises the optimal price for a ﬁrm in the current period.
Second, under discretion, the monetary authority takes as given prices set in previous
periods in determining its choice of the money stock in each period. Since its concern
is to maximize the welfare of the representative agent, which depends on real variables,
it chooses a money stock that is proportional to the price set by ﬁrms in the previous
period, which we call a homogenous money stock rule.
The combination of forward-looking pricing with discretionary policy leads to com-
plementarity between the price-setting actions of ﬁrms: if all other ﬁrms set a higher
price in the current period, the monetary authority will set a higher money supply in the
subsequent period, raising the desired price for a single ﬁrm in the current period.
We show that this policy-induced complementarity implies that there are typically
4two private-sector equilibria which can prevail at any point in time and two steady-state
equilibria. In general, there is one equilibrium in which ﬁrms expect small adjustments
and the newly set price is relatively close to the price that ﬁrms set last period. But there
is another in which the adjusting ﬁrms make a much larger adjustment.
Because this multiplicity of equilibria arises for arbitrary homogenous monetary poli-
cies, it also arises with an optimizing monetary authority who cannot commit to future
actions. We begin by considering settings of perfect foresight, in which the monetary
authority and private agents each assume that only one of the two types of private sector
equilibria will occur. We show that there are two steady-state discretionary equilibria,
one with low inﬂation bias and one with high inﬂation bias. It is notable that the comple-
mentarity which generates multiple equilibria is entirely due, in our model, to the nature
of monetary policy under discretion. That is: our speciﬁcation of preferences and the la-
bor market is such that there is no complementarity in the price-setting behavior of ﬁrms
if the central bank maintains a ﬁxed nominal money stock. Our setup thus highlights the
role of discretionary monetary policy in generating complementarity.
There is a rich literature on the importance of commitment for monetary policy. In
section 6 we relate our analyses to three branches of the existing literature. The ﬁrst
comprises the seminal works of Kydland and Prescott [1977] and Barro and Gordon
[1983]; they studied reduced-form linear models in which the policymaker had quadratic
preferences, and emphasized that discretion led to inﬂation bias. The second branch
is associated with the recent optimizing sticky-price models, which have typically been
analyzed using LQ approximations. The emphasis in this work has been on inﬂation
bias and stabilization bias. Finally, Albanesi, Chari and Christiano [2003] have show
that discretion leads to multiple equilibria in a diﬀerent kind of sticky price model — one
without the endogenous state variables which play such a crucial role here.
While our results concern an interaction between a monetary policymaker and a
forward-looking private sector that sets prices for only two periods, they are indicative of
a more general phenomenon, both in the context of monetary policy and in other areas
of economics. In section 7, we discuss some empirical implications of our model, consider
the consequences of extending it to multiple periods of price-setting, and describe other
potential settings in which similar phenomena might arise. Section 8 concludes.
52M o d e l
The model economy that we study is a particular fully articulated “New Keynesian”
framework, featuring monopolistic competition and nominal prices which are ﬁxed for
two periods. There is staggered pricing, with one-half of a continuum of ﬁrms adjusting
price in each period. Since all of the ﬁrms have the same technology and face the same
demand conditions, it is natural to think of all adjusting ﬁrms as choosing the same price.
We impose this symmetry condition in our analysis.
There are many diﬀerent types of New Keynesian models, which diﬀer in terms of
their implications for the extent of complementarity in price-setting. Our model assumes
that (i) there is a constant elasticity demand structure originating from a Dixit-Stiglitz
aggregator of diﬀerentiated products; (ii) there is a centralized labor market so that the
common marginal cost for all ﬁrms is powerfully aﬀected by aggregate demand; and
(iii) preferences for goods and leisure display exactly oﬀsetting income and substitution
eﬀects of wage changes, as is common in the literature on real business cycles. Kimball
[1995] and Woodford [2002] have stressed that these assumptions make it diﬃcult to
generate complementarity between price-setters when there is an exogenous money stock.
As we will, see our model has exactly zero complementarity in this situation. From
our perspective, this is a virtue because it highlights the importance of the policy-based
complementarity that arises from monetary policy under discretion.
2.1 Households
There is a representative household, which values consumption (ct)a n dl e i s u r e( lt)a c -
cording to a standard time separable expected utility objective,
Et{
∞ X
j=0
βju(ct+j,l t+j)} (1)
with β being the discount factor. We assume that the momentary utility function takes
the form
u(ct,l t)=l o g ( ct)+χlt (2)
which implies that there are exactly oﬀ-setting income and substitution eﬀects of wage
changes. It also has some other convenient implications that we describe later.
As is standard in the analyses of imperfect competition macro models that follow
Blanchard and Kiyotaki [1987] and Rotemberg [1987], we assume that consumption is an
6aggregate of a continuum of individual goods, ct =[
R 1
0 ct(z)(ε−1)/εdz]ε/(ε−1).H o u s e h o l d s
distribute their expenditure eﬃciently across these goods, resulting in constant-elasticity
demands for individual products from each of the two types of ﬁrms which they will
encounter in the equilibrium below:
cj,t =
µ
Pj,t
Pt
¶−ε
ct,j=0 ,1. (3)
The subscript j in (3) denotes the age of the nominal price, so that P0,t is the price set by
ﬁr m si np e r i o dta n dP1,t is the price set by ﬁrms one period previously (P1,t = P0,t−1).
Likewise, cj,t is the period-t demand for goods produced by a ﬁrm that set its price in
period t − j. The price level which enters in these demands takes the form
Pt =[
1
2
P1−ε
0,t +
1
2
P1−ε
1,t ]
1
1−ε. (4)
We assume that households also hold money to ﬁnance expenditure, according to
Mt =
Z 1
0
Pt(z)ct (z)dz (5)
so that our model imposes a constant, unit velocity, in common with many macroeconomic
analyses.1 We adopt this speciﬁcation because it allows us to abstract from all the wealth
and substitution eﬀects that normally arise in optimizing models of money demand, so
as to focus on the consequences of price-stickiness. With constant-elasticity demands for
each good, the money-demand speciﬁcation in (5) implies
Mt = Ptct. (6)
Since this is a representative agent model and since no real accumulation is possible
given the technologies described below, we are not too explicit about the consumption-
saving aspect of the household’s problem; it will be largely irrelevant in general equilibrium
except for asset-pricing. We simply assume that there is a Lagrange multiplier that takes
the form
λt =
∂u(ct,l t)
∂ct
=
1
ct
, (7)
and that households equate the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and con-
sumption to the real wage rate prevailing in the competitive labor market, i.e.,
wt =
∂u(ct,l t)/∂lt
∂u(ct,l t)/∂ct
= χct. (8)
1We think of this quantity equation as the limiting version of a standard money demand function which
occurs as the own return on money is raised toward the nominal interest rate (see King and Wolman [1999]
for some additional discussion).
7In each case, the second equality indicates the implications of the speciﬁc utility function
introduced above.
2.2 Firms
Firms produce output according to a linear technology, where for convenience we set the
marginal product of labor to one. So, for each type of ﬁrm, the production function is
cj,t = nj,t. (9)
This implies that real marginal cost is unrelated to the scale of the ﬁrm or its type and
is simply
ψt = wt
and that nominal marginal cost is Ψt = Ptψt = Ptwt
Much of our analysis will focus on the implications of eﬃcient price-setting by the
monopolistically competitive ﬁrm. The adjusting ﬁr m si np e r i o dta r ea s s u m e dt os e t
prices so as to maximize the expected present discounted value of their revenues, using
the household’s marginal utility as a (possibly stochastic) discount factor. That is, they
choose P0,t to maximize their market value,
[λt(P0,t − Ψt)c0,t + βEtλt+1
Pt
Pt+1
(P0,t − Ψt+1)c1,t+1].
As monopolistic competitors, ﬁrms understand that c0,t =(
P0,t
Pt )−εct and that c1,t+1 =
(
P0,t
Pt+1)−εct+1,b u tt a k ect,P t,c t+1 and Pt+1 as not aﬀected by their pricing decisions. The
eﬃcient price must accordingly satisfy
P0,t =
ε
ε − 1
Pε−1
t Ψt + βEt
¡
Pε−1
t+1 Ψt+1
¢
Pε−1
t + βEt
¡
Pε−1
t+1
¢ , (10)
w h e r ew ea g a i ng i v et h er e s u l tu n d e rt h es p e c i ﬁc momentary utility function. In fact, this
reveals one motivation for the form of the particular utility function chosen. In general,
both aggregate demand (ct) and the discount factor (λt) would appear in (10), but our
choice of a utility function that is logarithmic in consumption means that these two eﬀects
exactly cancel out. With perfect foresight, the pricing equation can be written compactly
as
P0,t =
ε
ε − 1
[(1 − θt,t+1)Ψt + θt,t+1Ψt+1]; (11)
8the optimal price is a constant markup (ε/(ε − 1)) over a weighted average of nominal
m a r g i n a lc o s to v e rt h et w op e r i o d s ,w h e r et h ew e i g h to nt h ef u t u r ei s
θt,t+1 =
βλt+1ct+1Pε−1
t+1
λtctPε−1
t + βλt+1ct+1Pε−1
t+1
=
βPε−1
t+1
Pε−1
t + βPε−1
t+1
. (12)
The weights on current and future nominal marginal cost represent the shares of marginal
revenue associated with the current and future periods.
2.3 Deﬁning Complementarity in Price Setting
The standard deﬁnition of complementarity — contained, for example, in Cooper and
John [1988]— is that the optimal action of one decision-maker is increasing in the actions
of other similar decision-makers. In our context, we are interested in complementarity in
price-setting in equation (11). The left-hand side of this expression is the action of the
particular decision-maker under study: the optimal price of an individual monopolistically
competitive ﬁrm that is currently making a price adjustment. Other monopolistically
competitive ﬁrms are also simultaneously adjusting prices: these ﬁrms take an action P0,t
that inﬂuences the right-hand of (11). The price chosen by the representative adjusting
ﬁrm inﬂuences the price level directly because Pt =[ 1
2P1−ε
0,t + 1
2P1−ε
1,t ]
1
1−ε and may also
aﬀect current nominal marginal cost. Given that prices are sticky, there can be real
eﬀects of variations in the price level, so that these could inﬂuence nominal marginal cost.
Finally, the weights on the present and the future in (11) also depend on the price level.
To determine whether there is complementarity, we must work through these mechanisms
and determine the sign of the relevant partial derivative. The extent of complementarity
will depend on the behavior of the monetary authority.
2.4 Timing
The sequence of actions within a period is as follows. In the ﬁrst stage, the monetary
authority chooses the money stock, Mt, taking as given P1,t, the price set by ﬁrms in the
previous period. In the second stage, adjusting ﬁrms set prices (P0,t). Simultaneously,
wages are determined and exchange occurs in labor and goods markets.
There are two important consequences of these timing assumptions. First, since price-
setters move after the monetary authority, they cannot be surprised by the monetary
authority during the initial period that their price is in eﬀect. Accordingly, the monetary
authority faces an economy in which it can surprise some agents (those with pre-set prices)
9but not others (those adjusting prices) within a period. This gives rise to a relative price
distortion across ﬁrms in the discretionary equilibrium that we construct, which in turn
means that there is an interior solution for the monetary authority’s choice problem. If we
reversed the timing order so that the monetary authority moved last, we conjecture that
there would not be a discretionary equilibrium unless some other aspect of the economy
were modiﬁed, such as allowing ﬁrms to reset their prices after paying an adjustment
cost.2 Second, the fact that the price-setters move after the monetary authority means
that there is the potential for more than one equilibrium price to correspond to a given
monetary policy action.
2.5 Complementarity with an exogenous money stock
We now consider a situation in which Mt = Mt+1 = M. Under the assumptions of our
model, it turns out to be easy to investigate the inﬂuence of other adjusting ﬁrm’s actions,
i.e., to compute the eﬀect of P0,t on the right-hand side of (11). The constant velocity
assumption (Ptct = Mt) and the particular utility function together imply Ψt = Ptwt =
Pt(χct). Hence, equilibrium nominal marginal cost is exactly proportional to the money
stock, Ψt = χMt. Since the nominal money stock is assumed constant over time, nominal
marginal cost is also constant over time and (11) becomes
P0,t =
ε
ε − 1
χM.
This equilibrium relationship means that there is an exactly zero eﬀect of P0,t on the
right-hand side: there is no complementarity in price-setting in this model when the
nominal money supply is constant.
2.6 Summarizing the economy by p0 and m
Under discretionary policy, the monetary authority will not choose to keep the nominal
money supply constant. Therefore, the optimal pricing condition (11) will not simplify to
a static equation. In general, however, equilibrium will be a function of just two variables:
a measure of the price set by adjusting ﬁrms and a measure of monetary policy. We
construct these variables by normalizing nominal prices and money by the single nominal
2The nonexistence of a discretionary equilibrium is a feature of Ireland’s [1997] analysis of a model
in which all prices are set simultaneously, before the monetary authority determines the current money
supply.
10state variable in this economy, the price set by ﬁrms in the previous period (P1,t = P0,t−1).
Deﬁne the normalized money supply as
mt = Mt/P1,t, (13)
and the normalized price set by adjusting ﬁrms in the current period as
p0,t = P0,t/P1,t. (14)
We can then express all variables of interest as functions of these two normalized variables.
From (4), the normalized price level is a function of only p0,t :
Pt
P1,t
= g(p0,t),
where
g(p0,t) ≡ [
1
2
p1−ε
0,t +
1
2
]
1
1−ε.
Aggregate demand is a function of both p0,t and mt :
ct = c(p0,t,m t) ≡
mt
g(p0,t)
.
This follows from the money demand equation:
ct =
Mt
Pt
=
Mt
P1,t
P1,t
Pt
=
mt
g(p0,t)
.
Further, since nt =[ 1
2n0,t + 1
2n1,t]=[ 1
2c0,t + 1
2c1,t], we can use the individual demands
together to show that total labor input is also pinned down by p0,t and mt :
nt = n(p0,t,m t) ≡
1
2
· c(p0,t,m t) · [g(p0,t)]
ε ·
³
p−ε
0,t +1
´
.
Leisure is the diﬀerence between the time endowment and labor input. Marginal cost is
ψt = wt =
∂u(ct,l t)/∂lt
∂u(ct,l t)/∂ct
= χct = ψ(mt,p 0,t).
Another variable of interest is the gross inﬂation rate, Pt+1/Pt. It is determined by current
and future p0:
Pt+1
Pt
= π(p0,t,p 0,t+1) ≡
g(p0,t+1)
g(p0,t)
p0,t. (15)
This follows directly from writing the inﬂation rate as a a ratio of normalized variables:
Pt+1
Pt
=
Pt+1/P0,t
Pt/P1,t
·
P0,t
P1,t
=
g(p0,t+1)
g(p0,t)
p0,t.
In a steady state, there is thus a simple relationship between inﬂation and the relative
price, π = p0.
112.7 Two distortions and monetary policy
The monetary authority in this model faces two distortions that are present in the private
economy and can be inﬂuenced by its actions. First, there is a markup distortion that
represents the wedge between price and marginal cost: it has consequences similar to
those of a tax on labor income. The markup is just the reciprocal of real marginal cost,
µt =
1
ψt
=
1
wt
=
∂u(ct,l t)/∂ct
∂u(ct,l t)/∂lt
=
1
χct
.
From the derivations above, the markup depends on p0,t and mt: µt = g(p0,t)/(χmt).
Second, there is a relative price distortion that represents a wedge between inputs and
outputs:
nt/ct = δ(p0,t) ≡
1
2
· [g(p0,t)]
ε ·
³
p−ε
0,t +1
´
.
The relative price distortion depends solely on p0,t. It takes on a value of unity at p0,t =1
(this would be the case in a zero inﬂation steady state) and is higher for other values of p0,t.
The trade-oﬀ that the monetary authority typically faces between these two distortions is
that choosing a higher money supply decreases the markup (good) and raises the relative
price distortion (bad).
Just as we showed above that all real variables could be described in terms of p0 and
m, the distortions can be described similarly. The summary role of p0 and m, together
w i t ht h ef a c tt h a ta ta n yp o i n ti nt i m et h em o n e t a r ya u t h o r i t yc a nc h o o s em (i.e. choosing
m in the current period is no diﬀerent than choosing M) has a strong implication for the
analysis of discretionary monetary policy.3 It implies that the level of the predetermined
nominal price P1,t does not restrict the outcomes a discretionary policymaker can achieve,
as long as the monetary authority in future periods behaves in the same manner.4
We now analyze outcomes under monetary discretion, proceeding in three steps (with
each a separate section of the paper). We begin by studying perfect foresight settings.
In section 3, we detail the nature of perfect foresight private sector equilibria under a
particular class of monetary policy rules. In section 4, we describe a full discretionary
equilibrium — with optimization by the monetary authority–in which policy is shown to
be in this class of rules. Finally, in section 5, we discuss stochastic discretionary equilibria.
3It is important not to misinterpret the parenthetical statement: any choice of Mt can be replicated by
choosing mt = Mt/P1,t. However, a policy of keeping Mt constant is not the same as a policy of keeping
mt constant.
4If the future monetary authority paid attention to nominal levels, it might be optimal for the current
monetary authority to do the same. We do not consider equilibria with this property.
123 Equilibrium with homogeneous policy
We begin by studying the nature of equilibrium price-setting (p0,t) given an arbitrary ac-
tion by the monetary authority and given perfect foresight. We assume that the monetary
authority adopts a policy rule of the form
Mt = mtP0,t−1, (16)
where mt is viewed as the policy variable. That is, the money supply is proportional to
the prices that adjusting ﬁrms set one period ago with a constant of proportionality mt.
We call this a homogenous monetary policy rule. This form of monetary accommodation
of past nominal variables is characteristic of optimal monetary policy under discretion, for
the following reason. The monetary authority is concerned about the real variables that
enter in private agents’ utility. It takes past prices as given, and there is no mechanism by
which the level of nominal predetermined prices necessarily constrains the behavior of a
discretionary policymaker.5 Thus, if we viewed M instead of m as the policy instrument,
we would ﬁnd that the optimizing monetary authority adjusted Mt proportionally to
P1,t, just as is speciﬁed in (16). It will economize slightly on notation and computation
to view mt as the policy instrument, and there is no loss in generality. In a discretionary
equilibrium, mt will be chosen to maximize welfare; in this section mt is arbitrary.6
A homogenous money supply rule means that the future money supply depends on
the price set by adjusting ﬁrms today,
Mt+1 = mt+1P0,t.
Consequently, under homogeneous policy and using the preferences introduced above,
it follows from the eﬃcient price-setting condition (11) that the nominal price set by
adjusting ﬁrms (P0,t)s a t i s ﬁes
P0,t =
εχ
ε − 1
((1 − θt,t+1)mtP1,t + θt,t+1mt+1P0,t) (17)
in equilibrium. The derivation of (17) from (11) involves (i) using the fact that nominal
marginal cost is Ψt = Ptχct given the speciﬁc utility assumption; (ii) using the money de-
mand relationship (Mt = Ptct); and (iii) imposing the homogenous form of the monetary
5The word “necessarily” appears because one could construct non-Markov equilibria in which all
agents agreed that P1,t did constrain the monetary authority. See previous footnote. We do not study
such equilibria.
6By contrast, under commitment, the monetary authority commits not to respond to P1,t, and the
choice is over sequences of Mt. King and Wolman (1999) study optimal policy with commitment in the
model used here.
13policy rule (Mt = mtP1,t). From (17), the normalized price set by adjusting ﬁrms (p0,t)
satisﬁes
p0,t =
µ
εχ
ε − 1
¶
((1 − θt,t+1)mt + θt,t+1mt+1p0,t) (18)
≡ r(p0,t,m t,p 0,t+1,m t+1).
The weight on future nominal marginal cost, which was deﬁn e di n( 1 2 ) ,c a nb ew r i t t e n
in terms of current and future normalized prices as
θ(p0,t,p 0,t+1)=
βπ(p0,t,p 0,t+1)ε−1
1+βπ(p0,t,p 0,t+1)ε−1. (19)
w h e r ew ea r en o we x p l i c i ta b o u th o wθt,t+1 depends on the present and the future. Equa-
tion (18) is a nonlinear diﬀerence equation in p0 and m that must be satisﬁed in a perfect
foresight equilibrium with homogeneous policy.
We view p0,t on the left-hand side of (18) as describing what an individual ﬁrm ﬁnds
optimal given the actions of other price-setters and the monetary authority. On the
right hand side, p0,t then represents all other adjusting ﬁrms’ pricing behavior, and the
function on the right hand side represents the implications of those ﬁrms’ behavior for the
marginal revenues and costs of an individual ﬁrm. In other words, r(.) is a best-response
function for the individual ﬁrm. We restrict attention to symmetric equilibria, so that
prices chosen by all adjusting ﬁrms are identical. We deﬁne complementarity in terms of a
positive partial derivative of the response function with respect to its ﬁrst argument. That
is: with perfect foresight, there is complementarity if ∂r(p0,t,m t,p 0,t+1,m t+1)/∂p0,t > 0.
In sections 3.2 and 3.3 below, we will make intensive use of the perfect-foresight best-
response function (18). First, we will use it to describe point-in-time equilibria; this
involves characterizing the ﬁxed points for p0,t, taking as given mt,m t+1,a n dp0,t+1.
Second, we will use it to determine the model’s steady-state equilibria under constant
arbitrary policy. That is, we will impose p0,t = p0,t+1 and mt = mt+1 = m and determine
the equilibrium value(s) (ﬁxed points) for p0. Both of these exercises will then serve
as inputs to our analysis of discretionary equilibria. There, (18) will summarize private
sector equilibrium for any action that the monetary authority contemplates, under perfect
foresight.7 With uncertainty, (18) will not hold exactly, but the mechanisms discussed
here will still be relevant.
7If we impose mt = mt+1 but allow p0t to diﬀer from p0,t+1, then (18) describes the dynamics of p0,t
for constant homogeneous policy. Such analysis might reveal interesting dynamics. However, it is not an
input into our analysis of discretionary equilibrium.
143.1 Complementarity under homogeneous monetary policy
There are two mechanisms for complementarity in (17) and (18) that will be operative
in our analysis of both point-in-time and steady-state equilibria. First, holding ﬁxed
the weights, P0,t has a positive eﬀect on the right-hand side in (17): it enters linearly
with a coeﬃcient of
³
εχ
ε−1
´
θt,t+1mt+1, which is positive because ﬁrms are forward-looking
and the monetary authority raises nominal Mt+1 proportionately with P0,t. Hence the
speciﬁcation of monetary policy has introduced some complementarity into an economy
in which it was previously absent.
Second, the weights in these expressions vary with the current price P0,t (or its normal-
ized counter part p0,t). This additional channel plays an important role in our analysis.
A reference value for the weight θt,t+1 is one-half, since (12) implies that the weight is
β/(1+β) with β close to one if if Pt = Pt+1. An upper bound on this weight is one: this
is a situation where ﬁrms place full weight on the future. Increases in the weight raise the
extent of the eﬀect discussed above, i.e., they raise the coeﬃcient
³
εχ
ε−1
´
θt,t+1mt+1 that
measures the extent of complementarity. The second mechanism is then that an increase
in P0,t (or its normalized counterpart p0,t) raises the weight on the future. This occurs
because a ﬁrm’s proﬁts are not symmetric around its optimal price. As the ﬁrm’s relative
price rises, its proﬁts decline gradually, asymptotically reaching zero as the price goes to
inﬁnity. By contrast, as the price falls, the ﬁrms proﬁts decline sharply toward zero and
may even become highly negative if the ﬁrm is not allowed to shut down its operations.8
Thus, when P0,t increases for all other ﬁrms, future monetary accommodation — and the
associated higher nominal price set by ﬁrms in the future — automatically lower’s the
ﬁrm’s future relative price. The costliness of a low relative price leads the ﬁrm to put
increased weight on future marginal cost.
3.2 Equilibrium analysis of steady states
To characterize steady-state equilibria for arbitrary constant, homogeneous monetary
policies, we impose constant m and p0 on the right hand side of (18). Steady-state
equilibria are ﬁxed points of the resulting steady-state best-response function for p0:
p0 =
εχ
ε − 1
m[1 − θ(p0,p 0)+θ(p0,p 0)p0], (20)
8At this point in the analysis, we do not explicitly take into account the shut-down possibility. But,
when we calculate discretionary equilibria, we do verify that the equilibria are robust to allowing ﬁrms to
shut down.
15with a weight on the future of
θ(p0,p 0)=
βpε−1
0
1+βpε−1
0
. (21)
Fixed points of the steady-state best-response function are constructed by simultaneously
varying current and future p0 on the right hand side. This is in contrast to ﬁxed points of
the basic point-in-time best-response function, which are constructed holding ﬁxed p0,t+1.
3 . 2 . 1 U n i q u e n e s so c c u r sa tz e r oi n ﬂation
A zero inﬂation steady state involves p0 =1 . Such a steady state exists when the nor-
malized quantity of money is m∗ ≡ ( ε
ε−1χ)−1. In this case, the weight on the future is
θ = β/(1+β), which is roughly one-half. The zero-inﬂation steady state is asymptotically
optimal under full commitment in this model (see King and Wolman [1999]) and provides
an important benchmark. Furthermore, if m = m∗, zero inﬂation is the unique steady
state; that is, p0 =1is the unique solution to (20) when m = m∗.
3.2.2 Multiplicity or nonexistence must occur with positive inﬂation
We refer to any m>m ∗ as an inﬂationary monetary policy, because if inﬂation is positive
in a steady state, then m>m ∗, as we now show. From (20), given that π = p0 in steady
state, we have
m =
1
( ε
ε−1χ)
π
[1 − θ + θπ]
=
1
[θ +( 1− θ)(1
π)]
m∗.
Thus, π > 1 if and only if m>m ∗.
Proposition 1 states that under an arbitrary inﬂationary monetary policy, for low
values of m there are two steady-state equilibrium values of p0. For high values of m,
no steady-state equilibrium exists. In a knife edge case there is a unique steady-state
equilibrium.
Proposition 1 There exists an e m>m ∗ such that for m ∈ (m∗, e m) there are two steady-
state equilibria, and for m>e m there is no steady-state equilibrium.
Proof. see Appendix.
From (20), steady-state equilibria for a given m are ﬁxed points of r(p0;m), where
we write the best-response function as
r(p0,m)=
m
m∗ · [(1 − θ(p0)) + θ(p0) · p0] (22)
16for the discussion of proposition 1.
Figure 1 provides the basis for a heuristic discussion of Proposition 1, based on the
best-response function r(). The dashed line in Figure 1 is the 45o line; when r() crosses
this line the action of a representative adjusting ﬁrm (the horizontal axis) coincides with
the optimal action of an individual ﬁrm as described by r(). The solid line is r() for
m>m ∗. When m = m∗ it is easy to see from (22) that there is one steady state, and
it occurs at p0 =1 .A ni n c r e a s ei nm shifts r() upwards. It is thus clear that p0 =1is
not an equilibrium point with m>m ∗, but that there is a prospect for an intersection
point somewhere to the right as in the case illustrated in Figure 1. At any such “low”
stationary equilibrium, it must be the case that the slope is less than one (if r(p0,.) crosses
the 45o line) or the slope is exactly equal to one (if it is a tangency). Let us call this ﬁrst
equilibrium p0.
Suppose the slope at a “low” stationary equilibrium is less than one, so that it is
not a tangency and corresponds to the case illustrated in Figure 1. As p0 becomes
arbitrarily large, θ → 1.F o r l a r g e p0, then, it follows that r(p0,.) approaches the line
(m/m∗)p0 from below. For high enough p0 then, r(p0,.) >p 0 since we are considering
an inﬂationary monetary policy (m>m ∗). We have assumed there was a ﬁxed point at
which ∂r/∂p0 < 1, a n dw eh a v es h o w nt h a tr() lies above the 450 line for high enough
p0, so there must be some other “high” p0 for which there is an equilibrium r(p0)=p0.
If m is high enough, the ﬁrst ﬁxed point does not exist, and r() lies everywhere above
the 45o line. We label the two equilibria with an asterisk (*) and carry them over to our
discussion below.
There are two mechanisms at work to produce multiple steady-state rates of inﬂation
for arbitrary constant, homogeneous monetary policy. The ﬁr s ti st h a tm o n e t a r yp o l -
icy is accommodative: if higher prices are set by other ﬁrms today, the future nominal
money stock will be higher in proportion. The second is that if all other ﬁrms raise prices
today and in the future, then the future inﬂation rate will rise and a single ﬁrm today
places higher weight on future nominal marginal costs, so that future monetary endogene-
ity becomes more inﬂuential on current price-setting. Looking ahead, the discretionary
equilibria we will construct below will involve constant, homogeneous monetary policy.
Necessarily, then, there will be multiple steady-state equilibria under discretion. However,
in order to construct those equilibria we cannot rely on the steady-state best-response
function.
173.3 Point-in-time equilibria
Solving the monetary authority’s problem under discretion means computing the point-
in-time equilibria that correspond to all possible current policy actions, and then picking
the best action. Before studying this topic in detail in section 4, we here begin by
characterizing point-in-time equilibria for an arbitrary policy action in the current period.
Point-in-time equilibrium refers to the values of p0,t that solve (18) for given current
and future monetary actions, and a given future price p0,t+1.The mechanisms described
earlier lead to the potential for multiple point-in-time equilibria. We assume that the
future money supply is given by mt+1 ∈ (m∗, e m), (i.e. steady-state equilibria do exist
for the assumed value of mt+1 and are inﬂationary) and that the future relative price
is consistent with one of the two steady-state equilibria that may prevail if that level of
mt+1 is maintained forever. Under these assumptions, there are either two equilibria in
the current period or equilibrium does not exist. Again, in a knife edge case equilibrium
is unique.
Proposition 2 If mt+1 ∈ (m∗, e m) is ﬁxed, then there exists ˘ m such that for mt < ˘ m
there are two equilibria in period t, and for mt > ˘ m equilibrium does not exist in period t.
Proof. see appendix for a sketch.
Point-in-time equilibria are ﬁxed points of the best-response function for current pe-
riod price-setters, which we write without time subscripts, using superscript prime to
denote next period:
p0 = r
¡
p0,m,p 0
0,m 0¢
=
1
m∗
£¡
1 − θ
¡
p0,p 0
0
¢¢
m + θ
¡
p0,p 0
0
¢
m0p0
¤
(23)
No expectation operator appears because we are assuming, for the purposes of this sec-
tion, that there is no uncertainty about future m and — more importantly — future p0.
Multiplicity of point-in-time equilibria occurs for much the same reason as multiplicity
of steady states. Because the future nominal money supply is endogenous, the current
price of other ﬁrms has an eﬀect of more than one-for-one on a single ﬁrm’s desired price
if agents weight the future heavily, as they do if m0 >m ∗ and p0 is high enough. Note
that as long as the future money supply is inﬂationary, there will be multiple equilibria
even for noninﬂationary current values of the money supply.
Figure 2 illustrates the multiplicity of point-in-time equilibria for m = m0 >m ∗,
for two diﬀerent beliefs about future p0. As above, the dashed line is the 450 line that
identiﬁes ﬁxed points: the two points marked with asterisks (‘*’) on the 45o line are
18the steady states from Figure 1. The solid line is the best-response function when agents
expect p0 in the future, with certainty. The low steady state is a point-in-time equilibrium
when agents expect p0 in the future, but the high steady state is not, because in that
steady state agents expect p0 rather than p0 in the future. In fact, the second point-
in-time equilibrium must be at a higher p0, because expectations make the future less
important than in the steady-state analysis of Figure 1: a larger increase in the weight
on the future is required for the second ﬁxed point to occur. The dotted line shows the
best-response function when agents expect p0 in the future, with certainty. In this case
the higher of the two steady-state equilibria survives as a point-in-time equilibrium, but
the the low-inﬂation point-in-time equilibrium is now higher than the low-inﬂation steady
state.
From (23), note that for given m0, lower m drives down the lower price equilibrium
and drives up the higher price equilibrium. Lower current m shifts the best-response
function down, with lower current marginal cost reducing the ﬁrm’s optimal price for any
price set by other ﬁrms. The lower ﬁxed point falls, but because the basic properties of
the response function are unchanged, there is still a second ﬁxed point, now at a higher
level of p0; at this high level of p0, high future marginal cost oﬀsets the lower current
marginal cost. Current monetary policy actions thus aﬀect the two equilibria in very
diﬀerent ways.
Figure 2 illustrates that beliefs about both current and future equilibrium selection
can aﬀect the opportunities available to a discretionary monetary authority. Raising the
current money supply shifts out the best-response function for ﬁrms, resulting in a lower
high-p0 equilibrium and higher low-p0 equilibrium. The likelihood of each equilibrium in
the present will thus alter the trade-oﬀ facing the monetary authority. Beliefs about future
equilibrium selection shift the current period best-response function for a given current
money supply, and thus also alter the trade-oﬀ facing the current monetary authority.
4 Discretion under perfect foresight
In a perfect foresight discretionary equilibrium, the current monetary authority sets the
money stock to maximize the representative private agent’s welfare, subject to
1. The behavior of the future monetary authority (m0).
2. The behavior of ﬁrms in the future (p0
0).
193. Optimal pricing by ﬁrms in the current period (p0). The monetary authority must
have beliefs about the selection rule used to determine p0 when a contemplated
value of m leads to multiple equilibrium values of p0.
Two conditions deﬁne a stationary perfect foresight equilibrium with discretion: (i)
the current and future monetary authority each choose the same action; and (ii) the
selection rule speciﬁes that only one equilibrium will prevail in every period. It is common
knowledge which equilibrium will prevail.
As we noted above, it is the essence of discretion in monetary policy that certain
predetermined nominal variables are taken as given by the monetary authority. Here, the
current money supply is set proportionally to the previously set price, P1,t = P0,t−1. This
l e a d su st ov i e wm as the monetary authority’s choice variable. Our analysis of equilibrium
under arbitrary choice of m revealed that in general there were either two point-in-time
equilibria or no point-in-time equilibria, as long as future policy was expected to be
inﬂationary. This leads us to expect multiple discretionary equilibria. In this section we
analyze discretionary equilibria where there is a constant probability of 1.0 on one of the
two private sector equilibria.
4.1 Constructing Discretionary Equilibria
We look for a stationary, discretionary equilibrium, which is a value of m that maximizes
u(c,l) subject to the constraints above when m0 = m.W eh a v eu s e dt w oc o m p u t a t i o n a l
approaches to ﬁnd this ﬁxed point. A comparison of the two approaches is revealing
about the nature of the multiple equilibria we encounter.
The ﬁrst computational method involves iterating on steady states. We assume that
all future monetary authorities follow some ﬁxed rule m0. Next, we determine the steady
state that prevails including the value of p0
0. Then, we confront the current monetary
policy authority with these beliefs and ask her to optimize, given the constraints including
the selection rule. If she chooses an m such that |m − m0| is suﬃciently small, then we
have an approximate ﬁxed point. If not, then we adjust the future monetary policy rule
in the direction of her choice and go through the process again until we have achieved an
approximate ﬁxed point. This approach conceptually matches our discussion throughout
the text, but leaves open an important economic question: are the equilibria that we
construct critically dependent on the inﬁnite horizon nature of the problem?
The second computational method involves backward induction on ﬁnite horizon
20economies. We begin with a last period, in which ﬁrms are not forward-looking in their
price setting and deduce that there is a single equilibrium, including an optimal action for
the monetary authority mT >m ∗ and a unique equilibrium relative price p0,T.T h e n ,w e
step back one period, taking as given the future monetary action and the future relative
price. We ﬁnd that there are two private sector equilibria. In fact, this is inevitable,
because the ﬁrst step backwards creates a version of our point-in-time analysis above.
Consequently, this approach establishes that the phenomena are associated with forward-
looking pricing and homogenous monetary policy, rather than with an inﬁnite horizon.
To construct stationary nonstochastic equilibria using this approach, we can iterate back-
wards from the last period, computing the optimal policy, {mT,m T−1,....} a n ds t o pt h e
process when |mt+1 − mt| is small, taking mt = m as an approximate ﬁxed point.
In either computational approach, our work begins from the perspective that the rele-
vant dynamic equilibrium is one that is Markovian, in the sense of Krusell and Rios-Rull
[1999]. In general, this equilibrium concept restricts the actions of the policymaker to
depend on a set of fundamental state variables that have intrinsic relevance to the equilib-
rium. In our setting, there are no such state variables, so that search for a nonstochastic
Markov equilibrium corresponds to determining constant levels of public and private
actions. When we do so, we ﬁnd that there is more than one nonstochastic Markov equi-
librium. We then consider a stochastic discretionary equilibrium in which each period’s
equilibrium outcome is determined by a sunspot that shifts private sector beliefs. When
we consider this extension, we continue to assume that the monetary authority makes its
actions a function of the state variables that are relevant to the private sector. We focus
on Markov equilibria because these impose the most structure on the problem (making
clear that our multiplicity arises from a single source) and provide the most tractable
solution. Furthermore, the Markov equilibria of the model have natural analogues in a
ﬁnite-horizon version of the model, making it clear that our results do not depend on
whether the model is literally an inﬁnite horizon one or simply the convenient stationary
limit of a sequence of ﬁnite horizon models.
The numerical examples that we study next have the following common elements.
The demand elasticity (ε)i s10, implying a gross markup of 1.11 in a zero inﬂation
steady state. The preference parameter (χ)i s0.9, and for convenience we set the time
endowment to 5. Taken together with the markup, this implies that agents will work one
ﬁf t ho ft h e i rt i m e(n =1 )in a zero inﬂation steady state. With zero inﬂation, c = n =1
since there are no relative price distortions, and thus m∗ =1 . Further, leisure (l)i st h e n
215 − c. Accordingly, in a zero inﬂation stationary state, utility is just ln(1) + 0.9 · (5 − 1).
A ﬁrst-best outcome would dictate that u(c,l) be maximized subject to c =( 1− l).F o r
the speciﬁed preferences, this leads to a ﬁrst order condition 1
n = χ or an eﬃcient level of
work (n)o f1.11. So, the increase in work from cutting the gross markup to one is 11.1%.
4.2 Optimistic Equilibrium
If the discretionary monetary authority knows that the low equilibrium will prevail, then
its problem is to maximize
u(c,l)+v(p0
0;m0)
where v(p0
0;m0) denotes the future utility that corresponds to a steady state with m0 and
selection of the low-p0 equilibrium with probability 1.0. The maximization is subject to
c = c(m,p0)
l = l(m,p0)
p0 = r(p0,p 0
0,m,m 0),
where r() denotes the response function on the right hand side of (23), and the presence of
p0 instead of p0 is meant to imply that we place probability one on the low-p0 ﬁxed point
of the response function. The monetary authority understands that future utility and
current price determination is inﬂuenced by the actions of the future monetary authority,
but has no way of inﬂuencing its behavior or the future price that will prevail. So, the
monetary authority maximizes current period utility.
4.2.1 Exploiting initial conditions
Figure 3 provides some insight into the nature of the monetary authority’s choice when
it knows that the p0 equilibrium will prevail for all time. For this ﬁgure, we assume
that future monetary policy is noninﬂationary (m0 = m∗, p0
0 =1 ) . The current monetary
authority optimally adopts an inﬂationary monetary policy (choosing m>m ∗ =1 )
because it can reduce the markup and stimulate consumption toward the ﬁrst-best level.
It does not completely drive the gross markup to one because an increase in m produces
relative price distortions. While the relative price distortions are negligible near the
noninﬂationary steady state, they increase convexly as monetary policy stimulates the
economy. Figure 3 illustrates the sense in which New Keynesian models capture the
22incentive for stimulating the economy at zero inﬂation, as described in Kydland and
Prescott [1977] and Barro and Gordon [1983].
4.2.2 An inﬂation bias equilibrium
Figure 4 displays the consistent steady-state equilibrium, in which agents correctly fore-
cast the incentives of the monetary authority. Panel A shows the policymaker’s objective
function, which can be thought of as an indirect utility function: the relevant portion
for the current discussion is the solid line, which reaches a maximum at the value of
m/m∗ =1.01. This implies a stationary relative price (p0)o f1.022, which is determined
along the lines of Figure 2 with agents expecting p0
0 = p0 and m0 = m. Given that there
is a steady state, π = p0 and this relative price thus implies an inﬂation rate of 2.2 %
per quarter. At this inﬂation rate, the monetary authority faces suﬃciently increasing
marginal relative price distortions that it chooses not to further increase m in an eﬀort to
further reduce the markup. Notably, the stationary markup departs little from its value
at zero inﬂation. Stationary consumption is 99.96% of its zero inﬂation value, so that
the markup has changed negligibly (recall that the markup and consumption are directly
related by µt =( ctχ)
−1 with the preference speciﬁcation used here).
4.3 Pessimistic Equilibrium
We next suppose that the monetary authority instead knows that the high p0 equilibrium
will always prevail. Its incentives are sharply diﬀerent. Looking at Figure 4, we can see
these incentives in the dashed lines, which describe a non-equilibrium situation in which
the private sector and the monetary authority assume that the future is described by
m,p 0 while the present is described by ¯ p0. The monetary authority has a clear incentive
to raise m>m since this lowers the markup and relative price distortions, with utility
being maximized when m is suﬃciently high that there is exactly a tangency equilibrium
in the temporary equilibrium analysis of Figure 2. Here the monetary authority “takes
policy to the limit” of the set of equilibria that are imposed as its constraints. Because
Figure 4 assumes optimism (that is, the low-p0 outcome occurs with probability one) ,
there are some inconsistencies in using Figure 4 to discuss an equilibrium with pessimistic
expectations. Notably, the monetary authority can lower the markup to less than one, in
w h i c hc a s es o m eo ft h eﬁrms in the economy are making losses. But the picture tells the
right story: nearer the consistent discretionary equilibrium that is described by a level
23m, the monetary authority still has the same incentives to raise m, but it does so without
producing the curious behavior of the markup shown here.
In fact, it is not necessary to make a complicated set of ﬁxed point computations in
this case. A tangency equilibrium is one in which
∂r(p0,t,mt,p0,t+1,mt+1)
∂p0,t =1 . Therefore, we
can simply solve the stationary version of the equation,
p0,t
∂r(p0,t,m t,p 0,t+1,m t+1)
∂p0,t
= r(p0,t,m t,p 0,t+1,m t+1),
to calculate the equilibrium value of p0 (this is one equation in one unknown p0 because
the m = m0 drops out). We can then determine the relevant m from the equation
p0 = r(p0,p 0,m,m).
In our numerical example, there is a consistent equilibrium with p0 =1 .17,s ot h a t
there is a 17% quarterly inﬂation rate in the pessimistic equilibrium with optimal discre-
tionary policy. The associated value of m/m∗ is 1.0295. This value is larger than the one
used to construct Figure 3, as it should be: a higher level of m is necessary to produce a
tangency equilibrium in the pessimistic case.
There are thus two steady-state equilibria with discretionary optimal monetary policy
in our quantitative example, one with low inﬂation and one with high inﬂation. The levels
of the inﬂation rates are quite diﬀerent: about 2 percent (per quarter) in one case and
a b o u t1 7p e r c e n ti nt h eo t h e r .
5 Stochastic equilibria
The generic existence of two point-in-time equilibria and two steady-state equilibria for
arbitrary homogeneous policy suggests that it may be possible to construct discretionary
equilibria that involve stochastic ﬂuctuations. We now provide an example of such an
equilibrium. We assume that there is an i.i.d. sunspot realized each period which selects
between the two private sector equilibria: in each period, the low-p0 outcome occurs with
probability 0.6, the high-p0 outcome occurs with probability of 0.4, and this is common
knowledge.9
9Our model does not pin down the distribution of the sunspot variable. However, some restrictions on
that distribution are imposed by the requirement that every ﬁrm’s proﬁts be nonnegative in each period.
For example, if α is 0.75 rather than 0.6, this condition is violated in the p0 state, and no discretionary
equilibrium exists. As in Ennis and Keister (forthcoming), it would be interesting to study whether
adaptive learning schemes would further restrict the distribution of the sunspot variable.
24In order for its maximization problem to be well-deﬁned, the monetary authority
must have beliefs about the current and future distribution over private-sector equilibria.
Above, these beliefs were degenerate. Now that they are nondegenerate, the problem
is slightly more complicated. Letting α be the probability of the low-p0 outcome, the
monetary authority maximizes
{αu(c(m,p0),l(m,p0)) + (1 − α)u(c(m,p0),l(m,p0))} + βv0
where v0 denotes the future expected utility, which again cannot be inﬂuenced by the
current monetary authority. It is important to stress that the low and high p0 values are
inﬂuenced by the sunspot probabilities, since they satisfy the equations
p0 =
1
m∗
"Ã
1
1+βEπ(p0,p 0
0)
ε−1
!
m +
Ã
βp0
1+βEπ(p0,p 0
0)
ε−1
!
E
n
π
¡
p0,p 0
0
¢ε−1 m0
o#
,
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where expectations are taken over the distribution of the sunspot variable. For example,
Eπ
¡
p0,p 0
0
¢ε−1 = απ
³
p0,p
0
´ε−1
+( 1− α)π(p0,p0)
ε−1 .
Because the sunspot is i.i.d., this expression holds for both the low and high current value
of p0. Note that uncertainty prevents us from writing (24) as the simple weighted average
that we used with perfect foresight.
5.1 Constructing Discretionary Equilibria
We can again apply the two computational approaches described in the previous section to
construct Nash equilibria. In implementing these, we assume that the monetary authority
and the private sector share the same probability beliefs.
5.2 Optimal discretionary policy
The relevant trade-oﬀs for the discretionary monetary authority are illustrated in Figure
5. In panel A, there is a light solid line between the objective function for the low-p0
private-sector equilibrium (the dark solid line) and the objective function for the high-p0
private sector equilibrium (the dashed line): this is the monetary authority’s expected
utility objective, which is a weighted average of the two other objectives. The monetary
authority chooses an optimal action that is about 1.0202, which is more stimulative than
25the earlier equilibrium action (1.01, shown in Figure 4) that was appropriate under ex-
treme optimism (α =1 ). But it is smaller than the equilibrium action appropriate under
extreme pessimism (α =0 ).
Figure 5 also highlights that the speciﬁc values taken on by p0 in the optimistic and
pessimistic equilibrium are endogenously determined in our setup, by current monetary
policy and the sunspot probabilities. By contrast, in the essentially static models of
Albanesi, Chari and Christiano [2002], the values of endogenous variables are not aﬀected
by the probability structure of extrinsic uncertainty.
5.3 Eﬀects of sunspots
Consider now the eﬀects of a sunspot on equilibrium quantities. We take as the reference
point the levels in the low-p0 private-sector equilibrium, which involve a markup of about
1.11 (close to the zero inﬂation markup) and a normalized price that is close to one.
If the economy suddenly shifts to the high-p0 private sector equilibrium as a result of
the sunspot, then ﬁrms become much more aggressive in their adjustments. With the
nominal money stock ﬁxed (Mt = mP1,t−1), there is a decline in real aggregate demand
since the price level rises. Consumption and work eﬀort accordingly fall. Alternatively,
the average markup rises dramatically, increasing distortions in the economy, to bring
about this set of results. Quantitatively, in Figure 5, the rise in the markup is from about
1.12 to about 1.17, so that there is roughly a 4.5% increase in the markup. Given that
markups and consumption are (inversely) related proportionately, there is a 4.5% decline
in consumption and work eﬀort.
6 Relationship to existing monetary policy literature
The study of monetary policy under discretion began with the seminal papers by Kydland
and Prescott [1977] and Barro and Gordon [1983], which we will refer to as KPBG. In
this early literature, output is ineﬃciently low, but can be raised by policies that also
produce unexpected inﬂation. There are costs of actual inﬂation, so that a consistent
equilibrium exhibits an inﬂation bias. The model that captures these ideas involves
a quadratic monetary authority objective and an economic model consisting of linear
behavioral equations. There is a unique discretionary equilibrium in the standard model
(absent reputational eﬀects or trigger strategies).
In recent years attention has shifted to optimization based models, such as the one
26here. Models very close to ours have been studied extensively, without uncovering mul-
tiplicity under discretion. We explain why below, and we contrast the multiplicity here
with that found by Albanesi, Chari and Christiano [2002] in a diﬀerent type of sticky
price model.
6.1 New Keynesian Models
There is an important recent literature that works out how the standard Kydland-
Prescott-Barro-Gordon (KPBG) model can be derived from a fully articulated New Key-
nesian framework. The key ingredients of the models in this literature are that output
is ineﬃciently low due to monopoly distortions; the monetary authority has temporary
leverage over the real economy because of staggered price setting; and the costs of ac-
tual inﬂation are welfare losses associated with relative price distortions. Analyses of
discretionary equilibrium in New Keynesian models has been conducted within linearized
versions of those models, and using a primal approach to policy (more on this below).
Just as in KPBG, there is a unique discretionary equilibrium, and it is characterized by
inﬂation bias.10
Our analysis takes the most basic fully articulated New Keynesian model, without
linearizing, and shows that there are multiple equilibria.11 Our model features costs of
stimulative policies — which bring about actual inﬂation — that stem from relative price
distortions across goods. It also features beneﬁts from unexpected stimulative policies,
which lower monopoly markups and raise output toward the ﬁrst best level. The model is
explicitly dynamic, with ﬁrms forecasting future inﬂation when setting nominal prices for
two periods. Multiple equilibria occur because of complementarity among price-setting
ﬁrms that is induced by the response of future policy to current prices.
It should be clear from ﬁgure 2 that nonlinearity is central to the multiplicity of
point-in-time equilibria we describe: the best response function of a price-setting ﬁrm is
10For a textbook treatment, see the derivation in Woodford [2002, chapter 3]. The inﬂation bias result
under discretion within such optimizing New Keynesian models has been popularized by Clarida, Gali
and Gertler [1999].
11Much of the New Keynesian literature uses the Calvo assumption of a constant probability of price
adjustment. The Calvo assumption implies that a positive fraction of ﬁrms charge a price set arbitrarily
far in the past. However, for many purposes this formulation has the advantage of tractability. For our
purposes however the Calvo assumption is more complic a t e dt h a nt w op e r i o ds t a g g e r e dp r i c i n g ,b e c a u s e
it would add a real state variable to the monetary authority’s problem. As we discuss below, adding a
real state variable leaves intact the fundamental mechanism generating multiplicity.
27nonlinear, and without nonlinearity there could not be multiple ﬁx e dp o i n t st ot h a tb e s t
response function. Multiplicity of steady state equilibria could survive linearization, in
that one could approximate linearly around either of the two steady state discretionary
equilibria. Previous analyses of discretionary equilibrium in New Keynesian models have
not uncovered multiple steady states because they have used a “primal approach;” instead
of specifying a policymaker who chooses an instrument and must accept whatever equi-
libria correspond to the instrument setting, they have speciﬁed a planner who can choose
allocations (thus, prices), subject to those allocations being consistent with private-sector
equilibrium.
If the policymaker can commit to future actions, the distinction between planning
problem and policy problem is immaterial in New Keynesian models. However, absent
commitment the distinction becomes important; the planner’s formulation rules out the
steady state with lower welfare. To see this, consider a planner in the current period
who knows that the future will be characterized by the steady state with lower welfare
(higher p0). It is optimal for the planner to pick allocations that correspond to a low value
of p0 in the current period, and thus the low-welfare steady state is not an equilibrium
to the planning problem.12 In contrast, a policymaker— who can only choose m —m u s t
respect private agents’ beliefs. If agents are pessimistic today and in the future, then
the current policymaker chooses an m such that the low-welfare steady state outcome is
realized today.
Without commitment, it is also important what the policy instrument is. If the
policy instrument is the nominal interest rate instead of the money supply, Dotsey and
Hornstein [2004] show that there is a unique Markov equilibrium, corresponding to the
low-p0 steady state of our model. This “Sargent and Wallace on their head” result is
somewhat misleading however: the focus on Markov equilibria rules out a continuum of
equilibria that would exist for exogenous ﬁxed nominal interest rate policies.
6.2 Albanesi, Chari and Christiano
Third, our paper is closely related to recent work by Albanesi, Chari and Christiano
[2002]. They ﬁnd multiple equilibria in an essentially static model where a portion of
monopolistically competitive ﬁrms must set prices before the monetary authority’s action
12Wolman [2001] illustrates the exact discretionary solution to the planner’s problem in this model,
and Dotsey and Hornstein [2003] solve the discretionary planner’s problem of this model using an LQ
approximation. In neither case does multiplicity arise.
28in each period. At the same time, the structure of the model they study is quite diﬀerent
from ours. The stimulative policies that produce inﬂation in their model also raise nominal
interest rates and lead to money demand distortions, either by driving a relative price
wedge between the cost of buying goods on cash and credit or by increasing transactions
time. A monetary authority thus faces a trade-oﬀ between the beneﬁts of driving down
the markup and these costs. In our model, instead of the costs of realized inﬂation being
related to money demand, they involve price distortions across goods whose prices were
set in diﬀerent periods.13
If there are sunspots which switch the economy between equilibria, there are also
important diﬀerences in the consequences that are suggested by our model from those
suggested by the ACC models. In our setting, if a high inﬂation equilibrium occurs when
agents attach low probability to such an event, then there will be a decline in output
because aggregate demand will fall and the average markup will increase. By contrast,
in the ACC models, a switch from low inﬂation to high inﬂation will have little eﬀect
on the average markup or output, with the main diﬀerence being the extent of money
demand distortions. Since the ACC models are essentially static ones, there is also another
diﬀerence: there is no feedback between the likelihood that economic agents attach to
future equilibria and the levels of inﬂation and output at a point in time. Accordingly
beliefs about the future are of no bearing for current events. In our model, beliefs about
future outcomes aﬀect the nature of the current policy problem because ﬁrms setting their
price in the current period care about both current and future monetary policy.
7 Discretion and Multiplicity more Generally
Multiple equilibria arise under discretion in our model because of policy-induced com-
plementarity among private agents. The complementarity involves interaction between
forward-looking ﬁrms and a future policymaker who will respond to the state variable
determined by those ﬁrms. We will argue here that similar types of complementarity
are present more generally when policy is formulated without commitment. For general-
izations of our staggered pricing model we know this to be true, and thus we speculate
on some empirical implications of monetary discretion. We then describe some other
13Dedola (2000) studies discretionary policy in a Rotemberg-style model of pricing, and ﬁnds multiple
equilibria. Dedola models money demand using a cash-in-advance constraint, and like Albanesi, Chari
a n dC h r i s t i a n o ,t h em u l t i p l ee q u i l i b r i aa r er e l a t e dt ot h em o n e yd e m a n ds p e c i ﬁcation.
29contexts in which discretion can lead to multiple equilibria because of policy-induced
complementarity among private agents.
7.1 Greater Price Stickiness
Multiplicity of equilibrium under discretion is not an artifact of two-period staggered pric-
ing. The key model element generating multiplicity is the existence of a nominal state
variable (here, the nominal price set by ﬁrms that adjusted their price in the previous
period). With prices set for more than two periods, such a nominal state variable would
still exist, but it would be an index of those nominal prices charged in the current period
but chosen in previous periods. Furthermore, there would be real state variables, namely
ratios of the current period nominal prices chosen by ﬁrms in previous periods. Solving
for an equilibrium under discretion is more complicated when there is a real state that
constrains the monetary authority. In Khan, King and Wolman [2001], we show that
multiple equilibria still arise with three-period staggered pricing. However, that analysis
is conducted using backward induction on a ﬁnite horizon model, and already with a two
period horizon we encounter some headaches. There are discontinuities in the monetary
authority’s policy functions, which makes it computationally diﬃcult — though not im-
possible — to extend the horizon beyond two periods. For this reason we chose to focus
here on the model without a state variable, where we are able to characterize equilibrium
with an inﬁnite horizon.
7.2 Empirical implications
There are tantalizing empirical implications of the kind of model we have discussed here.
First, a model with multiple steady state rates of inﬂation can potentially explain why
monetary policymakers can be caught at a high rate of inﬂation, in what Chari, Christiano
and Eichenbaum [1998] call an “expectations trap.” This could explain wide variation in
inﬂation rates across countries or time periods displaying similar structural features.
Second, the eﬀect of sunspots on economic activity that we just discussed in section 5.3
is a situation of “unexpected stagﬂation” arising because of shifting beliefs. Goodfriend
[1993] describes post-war U.S. recessions as arising from “inﬂation scares”, situations in
which markets suddenly come to expect higher inﬂation and a contraction in aggregate
demand occurs. The eﬀect that we describe above seems to capture some aspects of this
perspective, but it does not involve the increases in long-term expectations of inﬂation
reﬂected in market interest rates. To consider such eﬀects, which may be important for
30understanding the interaction of the U.S. central bank with the real economy during the
post-war period, one could introduce persistence into the sunspot process determining
equilibrium selection.
7.3 Discretionary policy in other contexts
Our emphasis in this paper has been on the link between lack of commitment for mon-
etary policy and multiple equilibria. However, the nature of the mechanism by which
lack of commitment leads to multiple equilibria suggests that the phenomenon is more
general. Whenever private agents’ forecasts of future policy aﬀect an endogenous state
variable to which future policy responds, there is the potential for policy-induced comple-
mentarity among private agents actions. Just as in our model, even without “structural”
complementarity among private agents, discretionary policy can create complementarity
a n dl e a dt om u l t i p l ee q u i l i b r i a .
As l i g h tm o d i ﬁcation of Kydland and Prescott’s ﬂood control example ﬁts into this
framework. Suppose private agents choose among two locations, one of which experiences
ﬂooding with positive probability. Agents have idiosyncratic preferences over the two
locations. After agents choose locations, a government chooses whether to impose taxes
and undertake costly ﬂood control. Suppose that the government is willing to let a small
number of inhabitants be ﬂooded, but will undertake ﬂood control if enough agents move
to the ﬂood plain. There can be multiple equilibria here of the sort that arise in our model.
When a single agent believes that no others will move to the ﬂood plain, she knows that
the government will not protect her, and chooses not to locate in the ﬂood plain. When
the agent believes that many others will move to the ﬂood plain, she knows that the
government will protect her, and she chooses to live in the ﬂood plain. Thus, there is
complementarity in agents’ location decisions. That complementarity is not intrinsic,
but is induced by the fact that location decisions determine a state (population in the
ﬂoodplain) to which the future policymaker responds. If the policymaker could commit
in advance to its action, it would determine a unique equilibrium.
Another example of lack of commitment leading to multiple equilibria comes from
Glomm and Ravikumar’s [1995] model of public expenditure on education. In their OLG
model, young agents choose how much time to devote to learning, given their expectation
of the income tax rate in the next period. Individual young agents’ decisions in the cur-
rent period determine next period’s individual and aggregate stock of human capital. In
turn, next period’s government chooses the optimal tax rate as a function of the aggregate
31stock of human capital, in order to fund valued public education. Thus, the future tax
rate eﬀectively responds to expectations of the future tax rate. Or, equivalently, an indi-
vidual agent’s current decision about human capital accumulation depends on aggregate
decisions because the aggregate determines the future state (capital) to which policy will
respond. For certain parameterizations the policy response induces suﬃciently comple-
mentarity among private agents’ decisions that there are multiple equilibria. Again, with
commitment the multiplicity disappears.
8 Summary and conclusions
We have described equilibria under discretionary monetary policy in a basic New-Keynesian
model with two-period staggered price setting. The trade-oﬀ that our monetary authority
faces is a familiar one. Output is ineﬃciently low because ﬁrms have monopoly power.
This creates an incentive for the monetary authority to provide unexpected stimulus, ex-
ploiting the pre-set prices and raising output. However, when it exploits pre-set prices,
the monetary authority also raises the dispersion of prices, leading to an ineﬃcient al-
location of resources. In equilibrium, the monetary authority is balancing the marginal
contribution of these two eﬀects.
While the monetary policy trade-oﬀ is familiar, the nature of equilibrium is not. Dis-
cretionary monetary policy leads to multiple equilibria. The multiplicity occurs because
of complementarity in pricing behavior that is induced by the monetary authority’s nat-
ural tendency to treat the level of pre-set nominal prices as a bygone. Under discretion,
in each period the monetary authority moves the nominal money supply proportionately
with the nominal level of pre-set prices. This feature of monetary policy means that
higher prices set by ﬁrms in the current period will lead to a higher money supply (and
even higher prices) in the subsequent period. Understanding this mechanism, an indi-
vidual ﬁrm adjusting its price in the current period ﬁnds it optimal to raise its price in
response to higher prices set by other ﬁrms. There is complementarity in pricing, and it
leads to multiple equilibria.
When we consider discretionary equilibria that are driven by a sunspot variable, the
equilibria involve random ﬂuctuations between diﬀerent real outcomes.14 If all ﬁrms
14The distribution of the sunspot variable shifts the equilibrium, and while we do not pin down that
distribution, it is an integral part of the deﬁnition of equilibrium. Thus far, we have only considered i.i.d.
sunspot variations, so as to produce the simplest possible explanation of the source and nature of multiple
equilibria. In future work, we plan to extend the analysis to the implications of persistent sunspots. This
32choose to raise prices by a large amount because they (rationally) believe that others are
raising prices, the result is a reduction in real aggregate demand and a decline in output
relative to the level that would prevail if smaller price adjustments took place. Economic
volatility then, as well as high inﬂation, may be a cost of discretion in monetary policy.
The mechanism leading to complementarity and multiple equilibria here transcends
our example of monetary policy in a staggered pricing model. Other environments which
share two features have the potential to generate similar results. First, private agents
must be forward-looking and their actions must be inﬂuenced by their expectations about
future policy. Second, private agents’ actions must determine a state variable to which
future policy responds. These features seem quite widespread, suggesting that lack of
commitment may be an important cause of economic instability.
extension would allow us to take the model more seriously as a potential explanation for some of the
volatility observed in actual macroeconomic time series.
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35AA p p e n d i x
A.1 Proofs
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 . (i) The conditions which characterize a steady-state equilib-
rium are (20) and (21). Multiplying (20) by the denominator of (21) reveals that these
conditions are equivalent to
p0 = h(p0), (25)
where
h(p0)=
m
m∗ + β
³ m
m∗ − 1
´
pε
0 (26)
Steady-state equilibria are thus ﬁxed points of h(), and ﬁxed points of h() are steady-
state equilibria.
(ii) For p0 > 0 the function h() is strictly positive, strictly increasing, and strictly
convex.
(iii) Deﬁne e p0 implicitly as follows:
e p0 : h0 (e p0)=1 .
At e p0,h() is tangent to the 45o line. By diﬀerentiating h(), we ﬁnd that
e p0 =
³
βε
³ m
m∗ − 1
´´1/(1−ε)
> 0, (27)
and e p0 is decreasing in m.
Convexity of h() implies that if h(e p0) > e p0 then h() does not have a ﬁxed point,
and if h(e p0) <p 0 then h() has two ﬁxed points. We now need to show that for low m,
h(e p0) < e p0, and for high m, h(e p0) > e p0. From (27) and (26), h(e p0) ≶ e p0 is equivalent to
m
m∗ ≶ (βε)
1/(1−ε) ((ε − 1)/ε)
³ m
m∗ − 1
´1/(1−ε)
. (28)
It is straightforward to show from (28) that there is a unique value of m, call it e m such
that h(e p0) ≶ e p0 for m ≶ e m.
Proof of Proposition 2. (Sketch) From (18) and (19), point-in-time equilibrium
values of p0 are solutions to
µ
m∗ −
m
p0
¶
= β
µ
g(p0
0)
g(p0)
p0
¶ε−1 ¡
m0 − m∗¢
, (29)
for ﬁxed m0 >m ∗ and p0
0.
36(i) The left side is strictly concave and increasing; the right hand side is strictly
increasing (since ε > 1), and either strictly concave (if ε < 2) or strictly convex (if ε > 2).
(ii) LHS →− ∞as p0 → 0+,a n d lim
p0→∞LHS = m∗.
(iii) RHS (0) = 0.R H S→∞as p0 →∞ .
(iv) Thus, this equation has either two solutions or no solutions.
(v) Can show there is a unique m, call it ˘ m such that LHS and RHS are tangent.
(iv) As m increases above ˘ m, solution disappears; as m decreases below ˘ m two solu-
tions emerge
371
1
*
*
Figure 1.  Steady-state best-response function for m > m*
p  set by all firms
01
1
*
*
p  set by all firms
0
low p  expected in future
high p  expected in future 0
0current m
 Figure 3.  The temptation to stimulate a zero-inflation economy
                                               (m'=1.0) Figure 4.  Discretionary equilibrium with optimism (low p  expectations)
                                       Equilibrium m=1.010
0 Figure 5.  Discretionary equilibrium with Prob(low p  )=0.6
                       Equilibrium m=1.020156
0CFS Working Paper Series: 
 
No.  Author(s)  Title 
2004/13  Klaus Adam 
Roberto M. Billi 
Optimal Monetary Policy under Commitment with
a Zero Bound on Nominal Interest Rates 
2004/14  Günter Coenen 
Volker Wieland 
Exchange-Rate Policy and the Zero Bound on 
Nominal Interest 
2004/15  Klaus Adam 
George W. Evans 
Seppo Honkapohja 
Are Stationary Hyperinflation Paths Learnable? 
2004/16  Torben G. Andersen 
Tim Bollerslev 
Francis X. Diebold 
Jin Wu 
Realized Beta: Persistence and Predictability 
2004/17  Uwe Walz 
Douglas Cumming 
Legality and Venture Governance around the 
World 
2004/18  Elena Carletti 
Vittoria Cerasi 
Sonja Daltung 
Multiple-bank lending: diversification and  
free-riding in monitoring 
2004/19  Torben G. Andersen 
Tim Bollerslev 
Francis X. Diebold 
Clara Vega 
Real-Time Price Discovery in Stock, Bond and 
Foreign Exchange Markets 
2004/20  Lars Norden 
Martin Weber 
The comovement of credit default swap, bond and 
stock markets: an empirical analysis 
2004/21  Andreas Jobst  The Basle Securitisation Framework Explained: 
The Regulatory Treatment of Asset Securitisation 
2004/22  Robert G. King 
Alexander L. Wolman 
Monetary Discretion, Pricing Complementarity 
and Dynamic Multiple Equilibria 
 
 
 
Copies of working papers can be downloaded at http://www.ifk-cfs.de  